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ABSTRACT 
Whether examinees’ answer changing behavior on multiple-choice exams is beneficial or harmful is a 
long-standing puzzle in the educational and psychological measurement literature. This article unravels 
the problem by formalizing it using the potential outcomes framework, which is the standard framework 
for causal inference. Clear definitions of the treatment and corresponding counterfactuals, expressed with 
potential outcomes, allow us to nonparametrically estimate the causal effect of answer changing. This 
article separately defines the average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and show that each effect, at least its 
bound, can be computed from the proportions of examinees’ answer changing patterns. It is shown that 
the traditional method in the literature of comparing the proportions of “wrong to right” and “right to 
wrong” patterns—a method that has recently been criticized by van der Linden, Jeon, and Ferrara 
(2011)—indeed correctly estimates the sign of the average answer changing effect, but only for those 
examinees who actually changed their initial responses. Analyzing two real data sets, including van der 
Linden et al.’s (2011) controversial data, this article finds that the answer changing effect is 
heterogeneous such that it is positive to examinees who changed their initial responses (ATT > 0) but is 
negative to those who did not change their responses (ATU < 0). The article also discusses whether the 
findings about the effect of answer changing are informative for predicting the effect of answer reviewing.  
 
KEYWORDS: answer change, potential outcomes, causal inference, average treatment effect on the treated, 
multiple-choice exam 
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INTRODUCTION 
During multiple-choice exams, examinees frequently find themselves in situations where they 
are unsure if their first choices are correct or not. Among students and teachers, it has often been 
advised that examinees should stick to their initial answers because people believe that the first 
thought is probably best (Lynch & Smith, 1972). This belief is still widespread today (see Liu, 
Bridgeman, Gu, Xu, & Kong, 2015, for recent examples; see also Kruger, Wirtz, & Miller, 2005, 
for psychological explanations for this belief). However, test theorists and experts in 
measurement have found quite opposite results. Since Lehman (1928), empirical findings have 
consistently claimed that examinees have gains by changing their answers (e.g., Liu et al., 2015; 
Lynch & Smith, 1972; Mathews, 1929; McMorris, DeMers, & Schwarz, 1987; Pagni et al., 2017; 
Wainscott, 2016). Benjamin, Cavell, and Shallenberger (1984) reviewed 33 studies and 
concluded that answer changing is indeed beneficial and the popular belief is wrong. However, 
van der Linden, Jeon, and Ferrara (2011) have recently claimed that their advanced item 
response theory (IRT) models, which are alleged not to be affected by confounding bias due to 
examinees’ ability levels, found a negative answer changing effect, and supported the popular 
belief. Since then, the effects of answer changing have gained new attention in the educational 
and psychological literature (see Bridgeman, 2012; Jeon, Boeck, & van der Linden, 2017; Kievit, 
Frankenhuis, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013; Liu et al., 2015).  
While the focus of recent literature has been on performing empirical studies with diverse 
items and subjects (e.g., Liu et al., 2015) and/or analyzing the data with sophisticated techniques 
(e.g., Jeon et al., 2017; van der Linden et al., 2011), a causal perspective on answer changing 
behavior has not been formally discussed in the literature. As a result, what kind of causal effects 
researchers are looking at and what assumptions are required to identify the effects remain 
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opaque to measurement researchers. Although it is not yet popular in the educational and 
psychological measurement literature, mathematical frameworks that deal with causation 
(instead of association) were developed and have already been used in many theoretical and 
practical studies for making causal inferences. The most popular one is the potential outcomes 
framework, developed by Rubin (1974, 1978), also referred to as the Rubin Causal Model 
(Holland,1986). This causal framework can shed new light on the puzzle of the answer changing 
effect.  
 This article investigates the causal effect of answer changing. Although the literature has 
been reluctant to make this intention clear, the article emphasizes the fact that we aim to know 
how answer changing behavior (treatment) causally affects examinees’ final scores (outcome). 
With clear definitions of treatment and corresponding potential outcomes, different types of 
causal effects of answer changing are defined: The average treatment effects (ATEs), the average 
treatment effects on the treated (ATTs), and the average treatment effects on the untreated 
(ATUs). It is shown that most of the prior studies have estimated ATTs, which are not generally 
comparable with ATEs or other types of causal effects. Using potential outcomes, the article 
provides simple nonparametric formulas to compute the causal effects of answer changing 
without relying on complex cognitive models and modeling assumptions (e.g., IRT models).  
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section defines causal effects of 
answer changing using potential outcomes and predicts the missing potential outcomes based on 
the special nature of the treatment (i.e., answer changing) under a simple true/false item case. 
The findings are then extended to a general multiple-choice item case. The subsequent section 
analyzes two real data sets, including van der Linden et al.’s (2011) controversial data—a set in 
which they found a contradictory result from prior studies but was later acknowledged to be from 
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a flawed analysis due to misalignment error (see Erratum of van der Linden et al., 2011)—and 
provides empirical evidence of the heterogeneous answer changing effect. The article concludes 
with a discussion of the theoretical contributions and the practical implications of the findings.  
 
CAUSAL EFFECTS OF CHANGING ANSWERS 
Defining Causal Estimands 
The potential outcomes framework helps us mathematically define target causal 
quantities regardless of analysis procedures. For examinee i, let iT  denote the treatment variable, 
whether he or she changes the initial answer ( 1=iT ) or not ( 0=iT ), and iY  the outcome, 
whether the final answer is correct ( 1=iY ) or incorrect ( 0=iY ), for a single item. Given the 
treatment and outcome, the potential treatment outcome )1(iY  is defined as the examinee’s 
hypothetical final answer correctness if the examinee would have changed the initial answer, and 
the potential control outcome )0(iY  is defined as the hypothetical final answer correctness if the 
examinee would have retained the initial answer. Note that those potential outcomes can be 
counterfactual, contrary to fact, and conceptually differ from the actually observed (factual) 
outcome iY . Then, the unit-level causal effect of changing initial answers can be easily defined 
as the difference between the two potential outcomes, )0()1( iii YY −= . The quantity i  
represents how much unit i would gain if the unit would have changed his or her initial answer, 
compared to if the unit would have retained it.  
Instead of focusing on a particular unit, researchers frequently aim to identify the average 
treatment effect (ATE) across all units in the population. This can be formally defined as 
 )]0([)]1([][ iii YEYEEATE −==  , (1) 
4 
 
where the expectation is taken over every unit in the population. Sometimes, policymakers are 
more interested in the average treatment effect on a specific subpopulation, such as those who 
actually received the treatment (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). This is referred to as the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and is formally defined as 
 ]1|)0([]1|)1([]1|[ =−==== iiiiii TYETYETEATT  , (2) 
where the expectation is only taken over treated units. In the context of this article, it quantifies 
the causal effect of answer changing only for those who actually changed their initial answers.  
Although ATEs and ATTs are the two most popular causal estimands in the literature, 
depending on the research questions, one may also define other types of causal effects. For 
example, one may define the average treatment effect on those who do not receive the treatment. 
This effect can be referred to as the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and is 
formally defined as 
 [ | 0] [ (1) | 0] [ (0) | 0]i i i i i iATU E T E Y T E Y T= = = = − = , (3) 
where the expectation is taken over only untreated or control units. In the answer changing 
context, it quantifies the causal effect of answer changing only for those who stayed with their 
initial answers.  
 
Counterfactuals by Response Types in True/False Items 
Before proceeding to the identification of the previously defined causal effects, let’s first 
consider examinees’ response types. Given an item, all possible response combinations of initial-
final answer correctness are categorized as four types: wrong-wrong (WW), wrong-right (WR), 
right-wrong (RW), and right-right (RR), as presented in Table 1. For ease of exposition, here the 
simplest possible multiple-choice item—that is, a true/false question (or items having only two 
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alternatives) is considered; a general case is consider later. In Table 1, iF  denotes examinee i’s 
first answer correctness, whether the first answer is correct ( 1=iF ) or incorrect ( 0=iF ). Thus, 
for the group of examinees of the type WW, the corresponding first and final answers are 
straightforward: 0=WWiF  and 0=WWiY . Their treatment status is also straightforward: since 
their first answers are identical to the final answers, they must not have changed their initial 
responses in true/false items: 0=WWiT .
1 Similarly, one can easily verify the triplet (F, Y, T) for 
the other three response groups. Essentially, only those who belong to either WR or RW would 
have changed their initial answers.  
Note that the variables F, Y, and T are all observable. In order to investigate the causal 
effects of answer changing, one should figure out potential outcomes Y(1) and Y(0), which are 
basically latent. Fortunately, one of the potential outcomes can be predicted. If examinee i was 
assigned to the treatment condition, the observed outcome would correspond to the potential 
treatment outcome )1(iY , while if the examinee was assigned to the control condition, the 
                                                 
1 As with many other studies (e.g., Jeon et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2015; van der Linder at al., 2011), 
this article only considers examinees’ first and final answers and ignore multiple corrections 
such as “wrong to right to wrong.”  
TABLE 1.  
Response patterns and corresponding observed and potential variables from true/false 
questions  
Type F Y T Y(1) Y(0) 
WW 0 0 0 ( a ) 0 
WR 0 1 1 1 ( b ) 
RW 1 0 1 0 ( c ) 
RR 1 1 0 ( d ) 1 
Note. F = first answer correctness; Y = final answer correctness; T = answer changing status; Y(1) = 
potential treatment (i.e., changing first answer) outcome; Y(0) = potential control (i.e., retaining first 
answer) outcome; WW = ‘wrong’ to ‘wrong’ response type; WR = ‘wrong’ to ‘right’ response type; 
RW = ‘right’ to ‘wrong’ response type; RR = ‘right’ to ‘right’ response type. 
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observed outcome would correspond to the potential control outcome )0(iY . In the causal 
inference literature, this principle is referred to as the consistency and is formally expressed 
(Robins, 1986) as 
 )0()1()1( iiiii YTYTY −+= . (4) 
Therefore, in Table 1, for the groups WW and RR who did not change their initial answers, the 
column of Y(0) can be filled up with their observed outcome Y. Similarly, for the other groups 
WR and RW who changed their initial answers, the column of Y(1) is filled up with their 
observed outcome Y. Unfortunately, however, one of the potential outcomes cannot be filled up 
by the consistency principle because it is not realized (e.g., potential treatment outcome are not 
realized for those who do not receive the treatment). Therefore, in Table 1, the potential 
outcomes in (a), (b), (c), and (d) seem to remain unknown. In the causal inference literature, this 
missingness problem is referred to as the fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland, 
1986).  
 
Predicting Counterfactuals in True/False Items 
Although the fundamental problem of causal inference is generally hard to solve, it does 
not occur in the context of answer changing in true/false items. The fact that the treatment 
variable is whether or not one changes his or her initial answer implies that the corresponding 
potential control outcome Y(0) should be identical to the initial response F. This is because the 
potential control outcome is, by definition, the hypothetical final answer correctness if one would 
have retained the initial response. Thus, the following holds:  
 ii FY =)0( , (5) 
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which allows us to predict the counterfactual outcome Y(0) using the observed variable F (i.e., 
initial answer correctness). Also, the potential treatment outcome Y(1) is the hypothetical final 
answer correctness if one would have changed the initial response. Therefore, it should be 
opposite to the initial answer in true/false items. Thus, the following holds:  
 ii FY −=1)1( . (6) 
Using Equations (5) and (6), all the remaining missing potential outcomes in Table 1 can be 
imputed, as presented in Table 2. For example, for the type WW, the missing potential treatment 
outcome in (a) in Table 1 should be opposite to the initial answer by Equation (6): 
WWiWWi FY  −=1)1( . As 0=WWiF , the potential treatment outcome is one: 1)1( =WWiY . That is, if 
one’s initial answer was indeed incorrect, changing a response to the other choice in a true/false 
item will make it right. All the missing potential outcomes in (b), (c), and (d) in Table 2 can be 
filled out in this way. As a result, the causal effect i  defined by the difference between the two 
potential outcomes is directly computed by each response type: 1==  WRiWWi   and 
1i RW i RR  = = − .  
TABLE 2.  
Substituting the potential outcomes and computing the causal effects from Table 1  
Type F Y T Y(1) Y(0) i  (.)P  
WW 0 0 0 ( 1 ) 0 1+  )(WWP  
WR 0 1 1 1 ( 0 ) 1+  )(WRP  
RW 1 0 1 0 ( 1 ) 1−  )(RWP  
RR 1 1 0 ( 0 ) 1 1−  )(RRP  
Note. F = first answer correctness; Y = final answer correctness; T = answer changing status; Y(1) = 
potential treatment (i.e., changing first answer) outcome; Y(0) = potential control (i.e., retaining first 
answer) outcome; i  = causal effect, Y(1)−Y(0); (.)P = group proportion; WW = ‘wrong’ to ‘wrong’ 
response type; WR = ‘wrong’ to ‘right’ response type; RW = ‘right’ to ‘wrong’ response type; RR = 
‘right’ to ‘right’ response type. 
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Let (.)P , the last column in Table 2, denote the proportion of examinees’ response type 
in the entire population such that 1)()()()( =+++ RRPRWPWRPWWP . Then, the ATE can be 
simply expressed as the weighted average of each group’s causal effects:  
 
).()()()(
)()1()()1()()1()()1(
RRPRWPWRPWWP
RRPRWPWRPWWPATE
−−+=
−+−++++=
 (7) 
Since all the proportions are known to researchers, the ATE is exactly computed. If one is 
interested in the ATT, instead of the entire population, cases where T = 1 are only considered. 
This is given by 
 
,
)()(
)()(
)()(
)(
)1(
)()(
)(
)1(
RWPWRP
RWPWRP
RWPWRP
RWP
RWPWRP
WRP
ATT
+
−
=
+
−+
+
+=
 (8) 
which is again computable. Note that the proportion difference in the numerator is scaled by the 
proportion of those who changed their initial responses, )()()1( RWPWRPTP +== . Similarly, 
the ATU is computed by  
 
( ) ( )
( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
.
( ) ( )
P WW P RR
ATU
P WW P RR P WW P RR
P WW P RR
P WW P RR
= +  + − 
+ +
−
=
+
 (9) 
Again, all the quantities are observed and thus the ATU is exactly computed. As such, 
interestingly, under true/false item cases, identification of causal effects of answer changing do 
not suffer from the fundamental problem of causal inference.  
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General Multiple-Choice Items 
 The key properties behind the previous derivation, which does not suffer from the 
fundamental problem of causal inference, are Equations (5) and (6). Obviously, such properties 
strongly rely on the fact that there are only two alternatives in true/false or 2-choice items: if one 
is incorrect, then the other must be correct, and vice versa. In the literature on the answer 
changing effect, however, researchers have frequently considered k-choice items, where k 
denotes the number of alternatives, and 2k  (e.g., McMorris, DeMers, & Schwarz, 1987; Reile 
& Briggs, 1952; Skinner, 1983; van der Linden & Jeon, 2012). With this type of general 
multiple-choice items, if one chose an incorrect alternative at first and then changed to another 
alternative, the final answer may still be incorrect because there are many distractors and only 
one correct alternative (Throughout this article, it is assumed that there is a single correct answer 
in multiple-choice items). Consequently, Equation (6), ii FY −=1)1( , stating that the potential 
treatment outcome is always opposite to the initial answer correctness, does not generally hold.  
Under this situation, it is necessary to separate the examinees belonging to the type WW 
by whether they indeed changed their initial answers or not. That is, even though the initial and 
final answers were both incorrect, some of the examinees might have retained their initial 
responses while others might have changed the initial ones to other incorrect alternatives. Thus, 
as in Table 3, the type WW is divided into two subgroups depending on the values of T: (F = 0, Y 
= 0, T = 0) and (F = 0, Y = 0, T = 1). In contrast, for the other three types, there is only one 
treatment status and thus no such dividing is necessary. For example, if the first answer was 
incorrect but the final answer is correct (i.e., WR), the examinees must have changed their initial 
responses. Relying on the consistency in Equation (3), again, half of the potential outcomes in 
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Table 3 can be filled up. But, the other half of the potential outcomes in (a1), (a2), (b), (c), and (d) 
remains unknown due to the fundamental problem of causal inference.  
 Although Equation (6) does not hold, the property ii FY =)0(  in Equation (5) is still valid 
even with general k-choice items. Regardless of the number of alternatives (whether 2k  or 
not), the potential control outcomes are the hypothetical final answer correctness had examinees 
retained their initial responses. Therefore, it is possible to impute the missing potential control 
outcomes in (a2), (b), and (c) in Table 3 with the corresponding first answers F: a2 = 0, b = 0, c = 
1. However, the missing potential treatment outcome in (a1) cannot be determined. The value can 
be either 0 or 1. In contrast, since only one alternative is correct, the missing potential treatment 
outcome in (d) in Table 3 must be zero. If one’s first answer was correct, changing it would 
make it wrong. The imputed result is presented in Table 4, where the subgroup of (F = 0, Y = 0, 
T = 0) is further divided into two, depending on the two possible values of (a1). Consequently, 
the proportion of the type WW is subdivided into three: )()()()( 321 WWPWWPWWPWWP ++= .  
TABLE 3.  
Response patterns and corresponding observed and potential variables from k-choice items, 
where 2k  
Type F Y T Y(1) Y(0) 
WW 0 0 0 ( a1 ) 0 
 0 0 1 0 ( a2 ) 
WR 0 1 1 1 ( b ) 
RW 1 0 1 0 ( c ) 
RR 1 1 0 ( d ) 1 
Note. F = first answer correctness; Y = final answer correctness; T = answer changing status; Y(1) = 
potential treatment (i.e., changing first answer) outcome; Y(0) = potential control (i.e., retaining first 
answer) outcome; i  = causal effect, Y(1)−Y(0); (.)P = group proportion; WW = ‘wrong’ to ‘wrong’ 
response type; WR = ‘wrong’ to ‘right’ response type; RW = ‘right’ to ‘wrong’ response type; RR = 
‘right’ to ‘right’ response type. 
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Since all potential outcomes are imputed, the causal effects of each row in Table 4 are 
straightforward. The ATE is then the weighted average of such effects:  
 )()()()( 1 RRPRWPWRPWWPATE −−+= . (10) 
Note that, compared to the ATE for the true/false items in Equation (7), the first term in the 
right-hand side in Equation (10) becomes a subgroup of the type WW. However, this causal 
effect is not identifiable because the proportion )( 1WWP  is unknown because it is defined with 
the potential outcomes. Although )(WWP  and )( 3WWP  are known because they can be defined 
only by the observed variables (F, Y, and T), the other two proportions, )( 1WWP  and )( 2WWP , 
are generally unknown. However, using 1 30 ( ) ( ) ( )P WW P WW P WW  − , one can derive a 
bound on the ATE:  
 
3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
P WR P RW P RR ATE
P WW P WW P WR P RW P RR
− − 
 − + − −
 (11) 
In contrast, the causal effect on the treated units, ATT, is identifiable because it is given by 
TABLE 4.  
Substituting the potential outcomes and computing the causal effects from Table 3 
Type F Y T Y(1) Y(0) i  (.)P  
WW 0 0 0 ( 1 ) 0 1+  )( 1WWP  
 0 0 0 ( 0 ) 0 0 )( 2WWP  
 0 0 1 0 ( 0 ) 0 )( 3WWP  
WR 0 1 1 1 ( 0 ) 1+  )(WRP  
RW 1 0 1 0 ( 1 ) 1−  )(RWP  
RR 1 1 0 ( 0 ) 1 1−  )(RRP  
Note. F = first answer correctness; Y = final answer correctness; T = answer changing status; Y(1) = 
potential treatment (i.e., changing first answer) outcome; Y(0) = potential control (i.e., retaining first 
answer) outcome; i  = causal effect, Y(1)−Y(0); (.)P = group proportion; WW1 = ‘wrong’ to ‘wrong’ 
response type whose treatment status is zero and potential treatment outcome is one; WW2 = ‘wrong’ 
to ‘wrong’ response type whose treatment status is zero and potential treatment outcome is zero; WW3 
= ‘wrong’ to ‘wrong’ response type whose treatment status is one; WR = ‘wrong’ to ‘right’ response 
type; RW = ‘right’ to ‘wrong’ response type; RR = ‘right’ to ‘right’ response type. 
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)()()(
)()(
3 RWPWRPWWP
RWPWRP
ATT
++
−
= , (12) 
which consists of all observable proportions. Finally, the causal effect on the untreated cases, 
ATU, is given by  
 1
1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
P WW P RR
ATU
P WW P WW P RR
−
=
+ +
, (13) 
but is not identified because either )( 1WWP  or )( 2WWP  is unknown. However, again, using 
1 30 ( ) ( ) ( )P WW P WW P WW  − , its bound can be computed by  
 3
3 3
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
P WW P WW P RRP RR
ATU
P WW P WW P RR P WW P WW P RR
− −−
 
− + − +
. (14) 
In sum, in general k-choice items, ATEs and ATUs cannot be identified. But, one can derive a 
bound on those effects. In contrast, ATTs can always be identified even with the general 
multiple-choice items.  
The ATT formulas in Equations (8) and (12) reveal one interesting finding. In the vast 
literature on the answer changing effect, researchers have compared the proportions of “wrong to 
right” and “right to wrong” patterns and concluded that answer changing is beneficial because 
the “wrong to right” pattern is more frequent than the “right to wrong” pattern (e.g., Benjamin et 
al., 1984; Edwards & Marshall, 1977; Lynch & Smith, 1972; Skinner, 1983). Although van der 
Linden et al. (2011) criticized this traditional method, the proportion difference 
)()( RWPWRP −  is indeed the numerator of the ATT formulas in Equations (8) and (12). 
Therefore, the traditional method correctly estimates at least the sign of the answer changing 
effect. It should be noted, however, that the results by the traditional method should be restricted 
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to examinees who changed their initial answers but should not be generalized to the entire 
population.  
 
REAL DATA ANALYSIS 
A Statewide 5th Graders’ Math Assessment Data 
Using the previous formulas, this section investigates the causal effect of answer 
changing with two real data sets. The first data set is a statewide 5th graders’ math assessment 
data from Cizek and Wollack (2017), in which students’ initial and final responses to each of 53 
multiple-choice items are recorded. Every item has four alternatives, and the total number of 
students is 69,806. In Table 5, students’ initial and final responses to item #1 are presented. As 
the key is ‘D,’ the following equalities hold:  
 
3
3
( ) (AB) (AC) (BA) (BC) (CA) (CB);
( ) ( ) (AA) (BB) (CC);
( ) (AD) (BD) (CD);
( ) (DA) (DB) (DC);
( ) (DD),
P WW P P P P P P
P WW P WW P P P
P WR P P P
P RW P P P
P RR P
= + + + + +
= + + +
= + +
= + +
=
 (15) 
TABLE 5.  
Counts of 5th graders’ initial and final responses to math item 1 
  Final Response 
  A B C D (key) 
Initial 
Response 
      A 3,039 13 25 295 
      B 8 1,426 27 109 
      C 26 21 4,263 336 
      D (key) 37 17 57 60,086 
Note. The total counts here (69,785) is slightly less than the total sample size (69,806) due to 
students’ nonresponses. The missing rate is negligible (less than .05%). For simplicity, this article 
ignores the missing data issue in the illustration.  
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where (AB)P  denotes the proportion of those who first chose ‘A’ but changed to ‘B,’ which is 
13 / 69,785  in Table 5 (all other proportions are obtained in the same way). Note that )( 3WWP  
is the proportion of those who first made a wrong answer but changed to another wrong answer, 
which is observed.  
Applying Equations (11), (12), and (14) to Table 5, it is found that   
 
1
1
1
.85 .73;
.65;
.87 .75,
j
j
j
ATE
ATT
ATU
=
=
=
−   −
=
−   −
 (16) 
where j denotes item index ( Jj ,,2,1 = ). Note that the causal effects of answer changing on 
item #1 is heterogeneous such that the item-specific ATE and ATU are negative while the item-
specific ATT is positive. This pattern generally holds in other math items. In Figure 1, all the 
item-specific ATEs and ATTs are presented (the bounds on ATUs are similar to that on ATEs). 
While no single ATE bound (vertical lines) has a positive lower bound, all ATTs (filled squares) 
except three items (i.e., #34, #35, and #46) are positive.  
 To summarize the result in Figure 1, one can define and compute the test-level answer 
changing effects as the average item-specific effects across all the items. The test-level bound on 
ATE can be defined as  
 ( ) / ( ) / ,
Test
j j
j j
lower ATE J ATE upper ATE J    (17) 
where ( )jlower ATE  and ( )jupper ATE  denote the lower and upper bounds of j-specific ATE 
bound, respectively. The test-level ATU bound is defined in the same way. And, the test-level 
ATT is simply defined as the average of all item-specific ATTs:  
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 / .
Test
j
j
ATT ATT J=  (18) 
It is found that .57 .18TestATE−   − , .40TestATT = , and .60 .20.TestATU−   −  Note 
that the bound on the test-level ATE is very similar to that on the test-level ATU. This is because 
the ATE is the weighted average of ATT and ATU, ATUTPATTTPATE =+== )0()1( , 
and the answer changing rate, that is, the treatment proportion )1( =TP , is rather small in the 
data set. In the data set, the range of the answer changing rate in each math item was 
[1.23%, 7.76%] . Therefore, the ATE becomes closer to the ATU, which has a larger weight.   
 
FIGURE 1. The bounds on the item-specific ATEs, denoted by vertical lines, and the point 
estimates of the item-specific ATTs, denoted by filled squares, from the statewide math 
assessment data. 
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Reanalysis of van der Linden, Jeon, and Ferrara’s (2011) Data 
The analysis of van der Linden et al.’s (2011) data is at the center of the recent 
contentious debate on the answer changing effect (see Erratum of van der Linden et al., 2011; 
Bridgeman, 2012; Jeon et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2015). They criticized the conventional approach  
implemented by earlier literature, which simply compares the two group proportions, ( )P WR and 
( )P RW , and proposed their new IRT approach, alleged not to be affected by confounding bias 
due to students’ ability. Contrary to the positive answer changing effect found by the 
conventional approach, van der Linden et al. (2011) found a negative answer changing effect. 
However, their empirical finding was retracted because they later found a misalignment error in 
the data files (see their Erratum). From their reanalysis using the corrected data files, van der 
Linden et al. found a lack of convergence with their proposed IRT approach and thus the 
conclusion remains inconclusive. Bridgeman (2012) argued that in his own reanalysis using the 
same data set, he found a positive answer changing effect. In the following, this controversial 
data set is reanalyzed with the causal approach presented in this article.  
The data set used by van der Linden et al. (2011) is from a 3rd graders’ math assessment 
program, consisting of 65 items and 2,555 students. Unfortunately, item-level data such as the 
kind presented in Table 5 are not available, but it is confirmed that the contingency table they 
reported in their article (van der Linden et al., 2011, Table 2, p. 389) is not affected by the 
misalignment error (in personal communication with the authors). In Table 6, their contingency 
table and the added corresponding proportions are presented. Fortunately, one may still infer the 
bounds on the ATE, ATT, and ATU from Table 6, where item-specific proportions are collapsed.  
The test-level ATE can be expressed as follows: 
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where (.)jP  denotes the proportion of the response type with respect to item j, (.)n  the total 
number of the response type across all items, N the total number of examinees, and J the total 
number of items. Although 
1( )n WW  is not identified, as the latent group count is bounded, 
)()(0 1 WWnWWn  ,
2 and the test-level ATE bound can be bounded:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Testn WR n RW n RR n WW n WR n RW n RRATE
NJ NJ
− − + − −
  . (20) 
Applying Equation (20) to Table 6, it is found .52 .18
TestATE−   − , which is negative.  
The test-level ATT is expressed as  
                                                 
2 In principle, the upper bound can be further reduced because )( 3WWn  can be identified. See 
Table 4, where the group 3WW  can be identified by the observed variables, F = 0, Y = 0, T = 1. 
Then, one can use )()()(0 31 WWnWWnWWn − . But, )( 3WWn  is not identifiable from Table 6. 
TABLE 6.  
Counts and proportions (in parentheses) of the four response types in van der Linden et al. 
(2011, Table 2, p. 389), collected from 65 items and 2,555 examinees  
 
Final answer 
Wrong Right 
Initial answer 
Wrong 
 
56,587 
(.34) 
11,543 
(.07) 
Right 
 
1,454 
(.01) 
96,481 
(.58) 
Note. The total count here ( 1660659648114541154356587 =+++ ) is slightly less than 
166075255565 = . This is probably due to nonresponded items, but it is negligible. 
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. (21) 
Note that, as opposed to the ATE formulas, the ATT formula above is directly computable from 
the observed data because it only contains the observed groups’ proportions (again, note that 
3WW  is identifiable but 1WW  is not; see Table 4). For each item j, one just computes the 
proportion difference between two groups, WR and RW, and divides it by the proportion of those 
who changed their initial responses and then, finally, averages across all the j-specific ATTs. 
However, Table 6, which is the contingency table across all 65 items, is not informative enough 
to compute the test-level ATT using Equation (21). It does not provide any item j-specific 
proportions.  
In order to estimate the test-level ATT using Table 6, this article takes a simulation 
approach. First, as the counts of the subgroups 1WW , 2WW , and 3WW  are unknown, the counts 
satisfying )()()()( 321 WWnWWnWWnWWn =++  are randomly selected. Second, 2,555 
examinees from Table 6 are re-labeled as either 1WW , 2WW , or 3WW  according to the first 
procedure, and randomly assigned to one of 65 item-specific tables. That is, a pseudo j-specific 
contingency table is randomly created from Table 6 and this process is repeated until all 65 j-
specific contingency tables are created. Finally, the j-specific ATTs from each pseudo j-specific 
table are computed and then their average is computed, which becomes the simulated test-level 
ATT for a single iteration. The entire procedure is repeated 107 times, and the minimum and 
19 
 
maximum values of the simulated test-level ATT bound are derived from the entire repetition. 
The bound is .15 .78
TestATT  , which is positive.  
 The test-level ATU can be obtained by  
 1
1 2
1
/
( ) ( )
/
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
/
( 0)
Test
j
j
j j
j j j j
j j
j j
ATU ATU J
P WW P RR
J
P WW P WW P RR
P WW P RR
J
P T
=
 − 
=  
+ +  
 − 
=  
=  



 (22) 
but it is not directly computable since 1( )jP WW  and ( 0)jP T =  are unknown. Again, the same 
simulation approach is applied, implementing the ATU bound formula in Equation (14). The 
bound is 1.00 .26
TestATU−   − , which is negative. Note that from the same simulation, the 
test-level ATE bound is also computed, and it was almost identical to the previous analytical 
result, .52 .18
TestATE−   − . This supports the validity of the simulation approach. Again, the 
reason the ATE is closer to the ATU than the ATT is the small proportion of treated units. In van 
der Linden et al.’s (2011) data, the proportion of the two types, WR and RW, who obviously 
changed their responses, is about 7.83%.  
 In Table 7, the results from both real data sets are summarized. They consistently show 
the heterogeneous causal effect of answer changing. Changing initial answers is beneficial to 
those who changed their initial answers (ATT) but is harmful to those who retained the initial 
answers (ATU). And, due to the small proportion of examinees who changed their initial answers, 
the overall causal effect of answer changing (ATE) is closer to ATU.  
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DISCUSSION 
Resolving the Answer Changing Debate 
 Reile and Briggs (1952, p. 110) asked, “Should students change their initial answers on 
objective-type tests?” Sixty decades later, Couchman (2015) still asked, “Should you rely on first 
instincts when answering a multiple choice exam?” While many measurement experts have 
claimed that changing answers is beneficial (e.g., Benjamin et al., 1984; Liu et al., 2015; Lynch 
& Smith, 1972; McMorris et al., 1987; Pagni et al., 2017), van der Linden et al. (2011) have 
claimed that it is harmful. In particular, van der Linden and his colleagues criticized how the vast 
majority of literature (which has reported positive answer changing effects) does not take into 
account examinees’ ability, which allegedly results in confounding bias in the answer changing 
effect estimate. However, van der Linden et al.’s proposed sophisticated IRT approach also 
requires its own modeling assumptions that might not hold in practice (e.g., in their own 
reanalysis using the corrected data, the model did not converge; see their Erratum). This article 
provided the causal framework that allows us to formalize answer changing effect irrespective of 
confounding bias and that does not require any parametric modeling assumptions. The findings 
reveal that the answer changing debate (see Bridgeman, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; van der Linden et 
al., 2011) can be resolved by the clear distinction of different causal quantities (e.g., ATE, ATT, 
TABLE 7.  
Test-level ATEs, ATTs, and ATUs from our 5th graders’ math assessment data (left) and van 
der Linden et al.’s (2011) 3rd graders’ math assessment data (right) 
 5th graders’ math assessment 
(53 items & 69,806 examinees) 
3rd graders’ math assessment 
(65 items & 2,555 examinees) 
TestATE  [ .57, .18]− −  [ .52, .18]− −  
TestATT  .40 [.15, .78]  
TestATU  [ .60, .20]− −  [ 1.00, .26]− −  
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ATU). Due to the lack of formal causal languages, researchers have previously not realized that 
each looks at different causal effects, which are not generally comparable. 
 In the real data analysis, it is found that the answer changing effect is positive, as many 
prior studies have claimed, to those who changed their initial answers (ATT > 0), but is negative, 
as van der Linden et al. (2011) claimed, to the entire examinees (ATE < 0) or those who retained 
their answers (ATU < 0). This indeed makes sense. The examinees who changed their answers 
did so because they might have a good reason to change their original choices (e.g., realizing 
mistakes). In this case, if answer changing is not allowed (counterfactual), their final score would 
likely decrease; that is, changing initial answers is beneficial. In contrast, the examinees who 
retained their initial answers did so because, again, they might have a good reason to maintain 
them (e.g., they were sure about the first solution). In this case, if they were to change their 
initial responses (counterfactual), the final score would likely decrease; that is, changing initial 
answers is harmful. The long-standing puzzle may be too obvious if viewed through the causal 
lens (i.e., the potential outcomes framework). Regardless of whether it involves changing or 
keeping the first choices, examinees should do whatever they believe to be true.  
 
The Effect of Answer Reviewing 
  Although the question of answer changing itself has long intrigued and puzzled 
measurement researchers, some researchers consider the question from a more practical 
perspective. Researchers and test administrators debate whether they should allow examinees to 
review the answered items, especially in computerized adaptive tests (CAT) (see Wise, 1996). 
Note whether an examinee has a reviewing opportunity or not (i.e., answer reviewing) generally 
differs from whether an examinee changes or retains his or her initial response (i.e., answer 
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changing). The relationship between the two behaviors and the final scores can be represented as 
in a causal diagram in Figure 2. The graph describes that examinees’ characteristics (e.g., ability, 
test anxiety) affect their answer reviewing decision, and upon reviewing, examinees may or may 
not change their initial answers. Based on their negative answer changing effect, van der Linden 
et al. (2011) suggested that “it may not be necessary to provide an opportunity to review and 
change answers to previous items in CAT because little may be gained and much risked 
(emphasis added, p. 396).” This suggestion assumes that knowing the answer changing effect 
would be informative to predict the answer reviewing effect. Although they made the opposite 
suggestion (i.e., answer reviewing should be allowed in CAT), Liu et al. (2015) assumed the 
same rationale.  
 
FIGURE 2. The cognitive process of test taking in multiple-choice exams. Various individual 
characteristics (e.g., ability, test anxiety, etc.) affect examinees’ answer reviewing decision 
and answer changing behavior. Importantly, the answer changing behavior is followed by 
the answer reviewing decision.  
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Although it sounds reasonable, such rationale is not generally true. The answer changing 
effect that many researchers have investigated, including this article, is not useful in knowing the 
answer reviewing effect, which might be of more practical interest. Pearl (2014) provided a 
useful theorem for this seemingly unnatural relationship. According to his theorem (Theorem 2, 
p. 110), inferring the causal effect of A on Y from the other treatment B’s effect on Y strictly 
requires that B affects Y only via A (i.e., all directed paths from B to Y go through A). Otherwise, 
the causal effect of A on Y cannot be inferred from the causal effect of B on Y. Replacing A with 
Answer Reviewing and B with Answer Changing, one can see that the causal effect of answer 
reviewing cannot be inferred from the causal effect of answer changing because as Figure 2 
clearly shows, Answer Reviewing does not sit on the direct path of Answer Changing → Final 
Score. When it comes to the signs, rather than the magnitudes, of causal effects, the same is true. 
Knowing the sign of the average effect of answer reviewing on answer changing (Answer 
Reviewing → Answer Changing) and the sign of the average effect of answer changing on the 
final score (Answer Changing → Final Score) does not allow us to infer the sign of the average 
effect of answer reviewing on the final score (Answer Reviewing → Final Score). VanderWeele 
and Robins (2010) showed that in a causal chain relationship of A → B → Y, when both the signs 
of the average effect of A on B and of the average effect of B on Y are positive, the average effect 
of A on Y can even be negative (see their Example 2 in pp. 119-120). In general, one cannot infer 
the sign of the effect of A on Y from the signs of A on B and of B on Y. Such inference requires a 
strong assumption such as monotonic effects (see VanderWeele & Robins, 2010, for more 
details).  
Therefore, our knowledge about the answer changing effect does not help us to infer the 
answer reviewing effect. Although this article found that average answer changing effect for the 
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entire population is negative (ATE < 0), it is possible that the average answer reviewing effect 
for the same population is positive. Having solved the long-standing puzzle about the answer 
changing effect, this article does not provide any evidence for the answer reviewing effect. 
Neither do other studies about answer changing. To answer whether answer reviewing is 
beneficial or harmful, a separate randomized experiment, manipulating examinees’ reviewing 
status, will be necessary (e.g., Vispoel, 2000).    
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